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A “Conservative Way of War?” The Rejection of the French and Napoleonic 
Military Revolutions during the early Nineteenth Century: The Archduke 
Carl and the Duke of Wellington. 
 
 
“The Archduke Carl and the Realities of Habsburg Warfare from 1793-1814: 
Less Change Then You Thought.” 
 
 
 
The Archduke Carl of Teschen, victor of Stockach and Aspern, and the Habsburg 
Monarchy’s most famous commander of the age,  was an unrepentant opponent of 
unlimited war; the type of war which he believed had been released by the forces 
of the French Revolution. To counter these new so-called realities, he looked to 
“limit” the impact of war through a combination of the Early Modern re-invention 
of Roman military principles, appeals to service, and the tenets of Theresian 
Catholicism. In the end, Carl responded to the “emotional,” read nationalistic, 
forces of the French with Habsburg revanche. This paper will look at two main 
areas. The first is Carl most immediate intellectual influence and a “snapshot” of 
his actual work. The second is Carl efforts to reject, or at least control, popular 
participation in the military (the civilian-soldier – or Landwehr). Evidence for 
these conclusions will be drawn almost exclusively from primary source material, 
especially the copious work of the Archduke himself.  
 
Taking the field against the French for the first time in 1794, Carl, holding the rank 
of Feldzeugmeister, assumed command of the Austrian Army’s reserve corps in 
Belgium. The war against Revolutionary France would begin again in earnest. 
However, despite a great deal of effort, the campaign failed and the French 
permanently removed the Habsburgs from the Netherlands, ending Carl’s several 
month career as the province’s governor. Claims of poor health and the political 
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intrigues of the Imperial Court combined to keep the archduke from a field 
command in 1795. Instead, he dedicated the year to the study of the “military 
sciences.” During this year of semi-retirement Carl completed his first military 
treatise, titled: On the War Against the New Franks.i Measuring the limited 
successes and glaring failures that the Austrians had experienced up to 1794, he 
puzzled over how the poorly disciplined and equipped French could defeat 
professional Austrian troops and commanders. Part of his answer was that the 
generals had lazily restricted themselves to a defensive war based on lines-of-
communication. But that was not the key, for Carl felt that: “...ignorance, 
indolence, and egotism are to blame for our misfortunes.”ii 
 
A critical intellectual underpinning for much of Carl’s work, and likely first given 
him by his tutor Sigismund Hohenwart, were the works of Justus Lipsius, the great 
Dutch Neo-stoic author.iii The Neostoics believed that the state must stand against 
all the extremes of nationalism and unjust expansion, preferring to take a 
“cosmopolitan” (or Imperial) position. For the Neostoic nothing took place by 
chance, but rather everything followed Providence in a set scheme, the individual 
remaining consistent in his service to the state. In sum, Lipsius called for an: 
“exceedingly severe, controlled manliness in the Stoic mold, in short for a 
character anchored in reason.”iv A commander, entrusted with the responsibility of 
preserving the army, was only to enter battle after great consideration, and then 
only rarely. The physical representation of self-control was in Lipsius’ insistence 
that when a general chose battle, he must hold back a strong reserve.v For the 
archduke the notion of the Neo-stoic and its restraints seem to have always rung 
true. 
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Lipsius, also an important source for the Dutch military reformer Maurice of 
Nassau, emphasized discipline as the foundation of a professional army.vi He 
classified wars as being either just or unjust, the determining factor resting on 
whether the instigator had a just cause and a just objective. Justification was 
secured through opposition to tyrants or the re-conquest of unlawfully taken 
territories. Because the ruler decided for or against war, it was something he had to 
weigh carefully, first driving the “war-mongers” from his court. Finally, Lipsius 
stated clearly that the lone objective of war is peace (the Archduke would restate 
this in his own work).vii In dealing with the human element of an army, Lipsius 
upheld discipline as the tonic for the restoration of order and morale. The general 
achieved this goal through the use of frequent drill, strict regulations, and 
obedience generated by both rewards and punishments. Applied correctly, Lipsius 
felt this would lead to a “moral regeneration” of the soldiery and a new mentality 
of service.viii  
 
In the same vein as his Neostoic mentality we find Carl’s commitment to 
Christianity. Along with the numerous documents concerning military affairs, he 
also took time to comment on the Gospels in a pamphlet titled “Religious 
Considerations.”ix This powerful influence came to the archduke from several 
sources. The first was the nature of the Monarchy’s vision of Catholicism under 
which he grew up, with its emphasis on the absolute nature of Heaven and 
subservience to it.x Carl’s tutor Sigismund von Hohenwart would also have 
conveyed much the same notion, hence his choice for the job by Maria Theresa.xi 
Finally, the archduke’s Neostoicism meshed with his Christian notions of duty and 
fatalism. In a detailed fashion, the archduke attempted to provide insight into the 
fundamental meanings of the four books of the New Testament. The theme of 
service runs through-out the “Considerations,” instructing the reader in the 
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importance of obeying God’s “Eternal Law.” This law, according to the archduke, 
called for one to love his fellow man and attempt to “do right” by him. This, Carl 
asserted, was the only road to God and a just life, not the existing humanistic spin 
on religion and especially not the overt secularism of the Aufklärung.xii 
 
Carl’s dogmatic Catholicism becomes most evident in his repugnance at war’s 
violence, especially the new, revolutionary form of warfare. On a number of 
occasions he makes it clear that he neither seeks war nor its glories. The primary 
example comes at the beginning of the Fundamentals of the Higher Art of War 
where the archduke clearly states that the: “greatest evil that can befall a nation is 
war,” it was a crisis that called for the general to act quickly in order to achieve a 
favorable peace.xiii Carl supported this assertion with a quote from Tacitus: “only 
rarely is a bad peace made better through war.”xiv This does not mean that war 
itself was illegal, or that it could always be avoided, but rather that warfare 
required limitations and a delineating set of principles. 
 
Carl’s first serious work on operations, The Fundamentals of the Higher Art of 
War encompassed the Neostoic notion of “limited warfare” and the unwillingness 
to evoke the full physical energies of one state against another. A general did not 
look to the annihilation of an opponent, but to force him into “offering terms.”xv 
The commander was to obtain success through the application of “decisive blows” 
(entscheidende Schläge) against a specified “decisive point” (Punkt). Carl felt this 
could be best achieved by uniting all available forces, his stated fundamental 
operational principle in the art of war. This massing of force applied in all 
circumstances and required scrupulous observance.xvi 
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Carl established that there were two forms of war: the defensive and the offensive. 
The difference was simple. A general that had a superiority of troop strength and a 
distinct geographical advantage took the offensive. He took the defensive only 
when placed at a distinct disadvantage. Switching to the offensive later, which was 
the goal of an active defense, became increasingly difficult as it required a change 
in the states’ “political will” (politischen Verhältnissen).xvii The basis of a 
campaign was the operation’s plan, which determined the “line” of advance and 
communications, referred to as the “operation’s line” (Operationslinie). Whether 
on the defensive or the offensive, the security of this line remained paramount, as it 
insured the flow of supplies and allowed for a secure withdrawal. If the enemy 
threatened or cut the operation’s line, the army would be forced into a 
disadvantageous retreat without battle.xviii The goal of the offensive was to thwart 
the enemy’s plans while gaining a clear superiority through the occupation of “key 
places.” These key places were geographic points of significance, such as 
fortresses or road junctions. The advance was to be cautious, with the operation’s 
line kept short. Because the defender had the advantage of fighting on home 
terrain, an advancing force required flanking detachments to guard against any 
“trickery” on the part of the enemy.xix 
 
Carl believed that the fortress presented the best strategic point for the creation of 
an operation’s base, the “key place,” whether on the defensive or offensive. 
Because these structures were so powerful, they dominated the placement of base 
lines. The fortress’s great tenability enhanced the defense of the line-of-operations, 
and in defeat it secured that line. On the defense fortresses covered the main 
approaches into the state while on the offensive they acted as a base of operations. 
If an enemy fortress sat astride the line of advance, or operation’s line, the army 
halted and initiated a formal investment. Because of its utility, states placed 
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fortresses at strategic points, such as the juncture of road or river networks. The 
location, size and number of fortresses also determined the offensive capacity of an 
area, as they provided a pre-made base line. The incorporation of a fortress in the 
line-of-communications was significant as it provided greater security in retreat 
and gave the army a point to rally.xx  “Without these cautions,” the archduke stated, 
“the continuation of the advance and the fortunes of war (Waffenglücks) would 
weaken and then dissolve.”xxi The emphasis that Carl placed on the use of the 
fortress was representative of his primarily defensive-oriented mentality.xxii 
 
Supply was, for Carl, a critical operational concern that faced a commander in war, 
and second only to the “key” points.  A general’s first responsibility at the outbreak 
of hostilities, even before the creation of a strategic plan, was the preparation and 
placement of supply depots. The general designated a primary line-of-operations 
(Hauptoperationslinie) that lead back from the army over a good road network to a 
series of fortresses or protected points. These pre-designated and protected points 
were the base from which the army operated.xxiii Carl believed that the careful 
accumulation and transportation of stores permitted greater operational flexibility 
and strategic security.xxiv The field commander’s primary concern was the 
movement of supplies and the protection of his magazines. As a rule he 
coordinated his movements to provide for the protection of supply columns and 
depots. Carl felt that the operation’s base should sit parallel to the enemy’s 
position, which allowed for the fewest possible threats. The army could then 
advance on a line perpendicular to the opponent’s base line. By placing the army 
between the base and the enemy the general secured his line-of-operations. The 
archduke generally discouraged broad flanking maneuvers for the simple reason 
that they exposed one’s own line-of-communications.xxv  
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When the operation’s line changed, then the influence of the surrounding region on 
the army did so as well. This resulted in necessary adjustments to the base line and 
the line-of-communications. The commander determined if the points once 
forming the original operation’s base remained essential for the rest of the war’s 
conduct, or whether they had only exerted an influence over that operation. Carl 
labeled the first type of point a “key to the region” insisting the army permanently 
sustain a line to it. He defended secondary points only when they offered a clear 
superiority and that single key point was not decisive. These points were also 
crucial in the case of retreat because the army would fall back upon them.xxvi 
 
In conjunction with these depots the archduke dealt with foraging, which he 
labeled as the act of acquiring the necessary supplies for men and horses. He drew 
a difference, however, between supplies taken by foraging and that drawn from the 
actual magazine, because troops acquired forage locally.xxvii Before sending out 
detachments to forage the exact needs of the army were determined and the region 
given a thorough reconnaissance. Carl estimated that most theatres of operation 
would have half of all available land under cultivation and two-thirds of that would 
have crops. The archduke set the responsibility for the gathering of forage at the 
regimental level, with all foraging parties to be led by staff officers in order to 
reduce pillaging by potentially licentious troops.xxviii While local acquisition was 
always possible, it was best that an army should carry what it could with it, 
acquiring the rest as it moved forward. Further, Carl emphasized that it was 
essential to pay with bills or cash for supplies acquired locally, because by using 
free purchase and quick payment magazines would always be full. This system 
kept the local inhabitants at peace and avoided exhausting the area in which the 
army operated. The archduke felt this policy limited the potential for partisans to 
rise up in the army’s rear areas. Carl would write mournfully in his history of the 
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War in Spain of the example of the French, and the disaster that their endemic 
pillaging brought. Conversely he held up Wellington’s very successful example of 
local purchase of supplies with cash as the ideal.xxix  
 
An example of the fear of provoking the forces of nationalism and destruction 
came in the Second Reform Period (1805-09) were Carl, again president of the 
Monarchy’s War Department, concentrated primarily on the sphere of tactical and 
operational restructuring.xxx Despite the changes that the Revolution had apparently 
brought about in military practice, Carl remained conservative in his goals. At no 
time did he hope to create or copy the radical structural changes carried out by the 
French. To build a national army similar to the one France fielded after 1792 
would have required a paradigmatic shift in the political and social structure of the 
Monarchy.xxxi Carl’s notion of military change remained confined within the limits 
of in his rational, supra-national dynastic orientation. The archduke’s idea was not 
to replace the old way, but instead looked to create an improved system, borrowing 
from the new where possible or unavoidable.xxxii Unwilling to tap into the potential 
Pandora’s Box of nationalism, Carl preferred to raise morale and motivation 
among the troops by building upon a combination of “character and 
education.”xxxiii 
 
A single, tactical example of the archduke’s rejection of many of the newer French 
innovations can be seen in how Carl viewed the rise of open-order fighting, or 
skirmishing. For him it represented an anomaly of the Wars of the French 
Revolution. He saw the genesis of these new methods as a combination of 
necessity and the French “national character.”xxxiv This change resulted from the 
fact that the French Army had been composed quickly and without the training 
considered standard at the time, and therefore forced the French to fight in “open 
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order.” Out of this necessity they created a new system, and because of its apparent 
successes, Carl responded to it.xxxv  
 
Carl found this tactical dispersal of strength a violation of the principle of unity, 
undermining any chance for a decisive victory. Allowing for the use of a large 
percentage of men to skirmish (herumschwärmend) created the danger of being 
caught dispersed by an attacking enemy.xxxvi Because of this the archduke did not 
believe that open fighting could be decisive on the battlefield, but he conceded that 
when facing an opponent using this tactic, one had to counter it with the 
deployment of skirmishers. The number of men committed would remain small, 
however, just enough to counter the enemy.xxxvii Carl saw the dispersal of troops, 
however few, as a risk because an enemy attack in column would not allow for 
their return, and might prove decisive. The men fighting in open order might be 
useful chiefly in tiring and demoralizing the enemy, but the real decision in the 
battle would come in the end from an army’s overall strength, types of troops, and 
use of terrain.xxxviii  
 
The difference between open order and the tightly controlled line-of-battle 
possessed some psychological importance as well. Carl felt the key element in 
keeping a soldier from becoming crazed or shaken with fear was the imposition of 
constant and blind obedience (Gehorsam). This meant that troops in a sound 
formation could not be “broken” by the skirmishers, because each soldier gained 
strength from his comrades. On the other hand the lone soldier was prone to the 
“emotional” effects of battle, isolated and susceptible to counter-attack. So while 
the new French system had succeeded in a few isolated battles, the ability to 
replace their losses was the real reason for their victories.xxxix  
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Carl felt that the Wars of the French Revolution had produced a time when the 
decisiveness of the strategic advantage was greater than ever before. There was the 
operational movement of massed troops in a fashion previously thought 
impossible, and the ability to replace losses made tactics even more subservient to 
strategy. Campaigns of a few weeks could produce results that would previously 
have taken years. Also, that while some traditionally important strategic points had 
lost their value, others had taken their place.xl 
 
Despite this the archduke still believed the principles of strategy retained their 
original spirit (Geist), allowing for the design of a specific system for each state. 
He wanted these principles to provide instruction, but he added that they were not 
dogmatic, because that would be both wrong and restrictive. Future leaders 
entrusted with armies needed to have the freedom to act once instructed in the rules 
of strategy. He emphasized not only the development of fortresses and the army, 
but also interior lines-of-communication like bridges, roads, canals, depots, and 
magazines. The close maintenance of these arteries must either be a maxim for an 
empire, or a matter of decline. The reason, Carl insisted, for France’s success at the 
end of the eighteenth century was its concentration on the “principles of the 
defensive system” with which it had subjugated all of Europe.xli 
 
Having made some sense, hopefully, of Carl’s effort to restrict the nature of 
unlimited, or perhaps, uncontrolled war that the French had unleashed, through a 
revitalization of the Army, we can look at a second issue. On the topic of militias, 
or “citizen-soldiers,” again Carl can clearly be seen in reaction, bowing not to new 
ideas, but simple, physical necessities. 
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As stated, Carl was an early modern soldier in all matters.xlii  At no time after the 
French Revolution or the evident successes of Napoleon did he significantly 
change his point-of-view.  In actuality, the excesses of revolutionary war horrified 
him.  This was particularly obvious in the archduke’s observations concerning the 
German campaign of 1796.xliii  The French “citizen-armies,” while capable of swift 
movement and tenacious fighting, crossed the landscape like psychotic locusts. 
Even more telling, they failed. 
 
Two things became apparent to Carl by the time that he had successfully repelled 
the armies of Jean Baptiste Jourdan and Jean Victor Moreau from Germany.  First, 
that an army composed of non-professionals lacked discipline.  In addition the 
French abandonment of secure supply lines resulted in the troops pillaging the 
countryside with no concern for life or property.  Second, that the archduke’s well 
timed and prepared counter-offensive caught the French by surprise and easily 
rattled them.  The citizen-soldiers, apparently unable to maneuver as did the 
Austrians, retreated rapidly and nearly disastrously.xliv 
 
With this in mind, and as Carl looked at the disasters that had befallen the 
Monarchy since 1792, the use of citizen-forces did not appear crucial.  Rather, he 
saw poor leadership and preparation at the heart of Austrian failure, with the 
French often surviving simply due to superior numbers.xlv  So that rather than 
succeeding due to the use of popular participation, they survived in spite of it.  
Only the later, undeniable leadership and organizational talents of Napoleon, 
whom Carl freely admitted a military genius, would save France.xlvi 
 
If a state could not allow for the feelings of patriotism based on some form of 
democratic experience, or the emotional and equalitarian estaticism that Napoleon 
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indulged, what was there?  With the violence and brutality of the Age of 
Mercenaries evidently over, what would compel a man to stay in the field?  For the 
archduke, due to reasons already discussed, the brutal treatment of the men was 
anathema, and therefore unacceptable.  He looked to reduce the level of coercion 
with a simple, enlightenment tool.xlvii  Instead of the rod or lash, a man was to be 
treated with respect, as a human being.  Corporal punishment was eliminated, 
enhancing rather than destroying a soldier’s concept of personal and therefore 
group honor.  Terms of service were also reduced from what was considered a life 
sentence to anything from 10 years for infantry to 14 years for the artillery.xlviii 
 
This new code, recreated to some extent from earlier drill regulations, appeared at 
Carl’s direction in 1807.  Treated humanely and with an equal sense of justice, one 
would develop a love of the Monarchy through an honest life lived under the 
“soldierly virtues” of obedience, loyalty and resolution.xlix  Therefore loyalty to the 
system and élan were products of the pride and security that each man felt in his 
regiment.  Evidence for this would be seen in a willingness to defend the unit’s 
reputation and to carry out all assigned tasks. 
 
While this notion of the “noble-soldier” represents a certain unrealistic simplicity 
and perhaps even idealism, it sits at the foundation of the intellectual make-up of 
the archduke.  Carl’s wish to create an army of good men, rather than the Duke of 
Wellington’s “scum of the earth” cliché, was not new with him, but unique among 
his contemporaries.  Rather than having “citizen-soldiers,” the archduke would 
wish to create “soldier-citizens.”  These men served not for money or to avoid 
prison, nor from the Romantic notion of nationalism, but due to a committed 
loyalty to the Monarchy and their regiments.  Such a feeling of dedication, if it 
could be made to exist, would be not only useful but controllable.  
 13 
 
The concept of irregular troops: Landwehr, Freiwillingen, and Insurrectio, all 
conflicted with Carl’s concept of duty, service, and loyalty.  This belief was 
reinforced by the poor performance of many Landwehr units in the early stages of 
the 1809 war.  Hastily assembled, with questionable training and motivation, these 
men remained suspect.  How could they understand the soldierly virtues?  To the 
archduke such ideas were best represented in the writings of his favorite author, 
Tacitus.  In Tacitus’s Agricola Carl saw the embodiment of his ideal: A man that 
combined order and discipline with a sense of trust and submission to duty.l  The 
archduke, who saw himself as a kindred spirit to Agricola, success belonged to the 
resolute commander of veteran troops, be they Roman or Austrian. 
 
A fear of brutality and destruction caused by the passions that might be unleashed 
in citizen-soldiers also frightened the archduke.  He saw war as the greatest evil 
that could befall a state, and that it was a general’s primary duty to achieve an 
advantageous peace.li  In doing so a commander, having the mechanism of state 
power at his disposal, was not to achieve victory by any means but rather through 
the cool consideration of events.  In all of his theoretical writings on the manner of 
warfare, Carl never mentioned the employment of militia units or even their 
existence.  This despite the fact that his most celebrated work on war, The 
Principles of Strategy, was written in 1813.lii  Perhaps the citizen-soldier was 
ignored as he cannot be seen as having a place in the scientific theories of war, but 
instead existed only as an anomaly. 
 
Taken into account as a non-functional part of the military machine that fit Carl’s 
complex and specific plans for warfare, the omission of irregular units makes 
sense.  At the center of the archduke’s strategic and operational planning was 
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maneuver, or the need to have troops that could and would march.liii  As the 
Austrian Landwehr showed in 1809, long, tedious marches quickly broke their 
morale and sent them home.  Even when used as replacement units for duty in 
garrisons on the borders of the Monarchy their usefulness came into question.  
Since Carl placed great importance on holding his fortresses as key points in a 
system of depots and base lines, untrained troops that could not be trusted were 
unacceptable.liv 
 
In the archduke’s revulsion to unnecessary violence; especially that perpetrated 
against non-combatants, there is a spiritual source.  A devout Catholic, Carl held to 
an “Eternal Law,” as he believed was evident in the Gospels.  This Law required 
one to “love his fellow man” and attempt to “do right” by him.lv  Only an army of 
disciplined and professional soldiers, kept in check by a Neostoic commander, 
could keep the passions released by war in check. 
 
It is clear that the Austrians, under the leadership and theoretical influence of the 
Archduke Carl, did not favor militia formations. It was simply not a part of their 
“way of war.”  The creation and existence of large numbers of militia, especially 
during the Wars of 1809 and 1813-14, was a strictly a matter of necessity.  Due to 
the losses of the previous 15 years of warfare preceding 1808, manpower needs 
forced the creation of the Landwehr.  Militias served, therefore, as filler units for 
battle losses and wastage rather than for political or social reasons.  It is also clear 
that the archduke, for theoretical reasons as well as personal beliefs, did not see 
this system as a permanent creation.  Because of this the Monarchy’s Landwehr, 
Freiwillingen, and Insurrectio must be seen as an expedient, never a source of 
change. 
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It has become popular, for those with an interest in Napoleonic warfare, to see the 
Archduke Carl as a reformer and bringer of change. I believe that this is a mistake. 
Rather, he was a reformer, keen to revitalize and invigorate. He never looked to 
real change, the sort that required political and social change, and never did. As 
late as his last year, 1847, he still rejected political change. This paper has 
hopefully made that case, albeit briefly, clear. 
 
Lee W. Eysturlid          IMSA 
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